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JUDICIAL RETENTION EVALUATION
PROGRAMS
Seth S. Andersen*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Judicial retention evaluation programs are a key component of
efforts to make judicial retention elections more meaningful contests
for voters by providing objective, survey-based information on the
performance of judges standing for retention. Official judicial performance evaluation programs for retention elections are currently in
use in six states: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Utah. Alaska was the first state to adopt such a program in
1976.2 New Mexico's Judicial Performance Evaluation 3Program is
the newest, implemented by supreme court order in 1997.
While the current trend appears to favor adoption of official retention evaluation programs in more states, it is important to note
* Former Director, Hunter Center for Judicial Selection, American Judicature Society. Project Manager, Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, American Bar Association. This paper was prepared specifically for the
Summit on Improving Judicial Selection. The views expressed in this paper
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, opinions or positions of the National Center for State Courts, the American Bar Association,
the American Judicature Society, the Joyce Foundation, or the Open Society
Institute.
1. See UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS IN AMERICA'S COURTS: THE
REPORTS OF THE TASK FORCES OF CITIZENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS 99

(2000), available at http://vw.constitutionprojectorg/ci/reports/uncertain_
justice.pdfo(ast visited Feb. 27,2001) [hereinafter UNCERTAIN JUSTICE].
2. See SARA MATHIAS, ELECTING JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL
ELECTION REFORMS 20 (1990).
3. See Amended Order Establishing Judicial performance, N.M. Sup. Ct.
(1999); Order Establishing Judicial Performance, N.M. Sup. Ct. (1997); New
Mexico JudicialPerformanceEvaluation Commission, 2000 Voter Information
Guide, available at http://www.nmeourts.com/JPE.pdf (last visited Mar. 11,
2001) [hereinafter New Mexico JudicialCommission].
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that only six of the nineteen states that hold retention elections at
some or all levels of court have adopted such programs. 4 Concerns
about the fairness of survey methodologies and evaluation commission procedures, as well as a general reticence among many judges to
subject themselves to an evaluation process that may be seen as a
threat to decisional independence,5 have helped to stall the expansion
of retention evaluation programs.
This briefing paper will focus on official, state-sponsored, judicial performance evaluation programs that are used to provide voters
with information and recommendations in retention elections. Bar
polls, and other types of judicial performance evaluation programs
that are conducted in many states, either solely for judicial selfimprovement purposes or to aid in the reappointment decisions of
governors or nominating commissions, do not fall within the scope
of this paper.
Judicial retention evaluation programs can be characterized as
having some common elements: official status; broad-based survey
mechanisms; wide dissemination of survey results and recommendations; and judicial self-improvement.
Funding for these judicial evaluation programs establishes their
official status. In contrast to judicial evaluation surveys that are conducted by bar associations, interest groups, or other private entities,
the programs considered in this paper are established by law or court
order, and are funded through the legislature or the judicial branch.
In most instances, the members of judicial performance evaluation
6
commissions are appointed by elected officials and/or judges.
Official judicial retention evaluation programs utilize a broadbased approach to surveying court users. Unlike bar association
polls, which by definition seek only the opinions of attorneys on judicial performance, judicial retention evaluation programs may also
include surveys of jurors, litigants, witnesses, court staff, police and
probation officers, social service personnel, and others who are in a

4. See UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supranote 1, at 99.
5. See A. John Pelander, JudicialPerformance Review in Arizona: Goals,
PracticalEffects and Concerns, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 643, 665 (1998) (discussing
judges' opposition to Arizona's judicial performance review pilot).
6. See id. at 669-70, 683.
7. See id. at 648.
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position to evaluate judicial performance! In addition, performance
evaluation commissions consider nonsurvey sources of information,
including personal interviews with the judges being evaluated, discipline records, caseload evaluations, 9 and completion of continuing
judicial education requirements.
Official judicial retention evaluation programs strive for the
widest possible dissemination of results to voters. While some states
are restricted by limited resources, several states are able to send survey results and recommendations to all registered voters.' 0 More
detailed information on dissemination can be found in the "Program
Models" section of this paper.
Although the primary purpose of most judicial performance
evaluation programs is to provide voters in retention elections with
an objective source of information, all programs also include an important judicial self-improvement component through confidential
midterm evaluations and interviews with judges under evaluation.'I
The anonymity of survey responses also provides judges vith systematic and honest feedback on their performance that is seldom
forthcoming under normal circumstances.
Ir. RATIONALE BEHIND PROGRAMS

Judicial merit selection plans seek to strike a balance between
the often competing demands for both judicial independence and accountability to the public by providing for initial appointment
through a nominating commission and subsequent terms through
noncompetitive retention elections. Retention elections provide accountability in theory, but in practice they can suffer from the same
lack of publicity and voter interest as competitive judicial elections
often do. The starkest measure of voter interest in retention elections
is rolloff-the percentage of balloting voters who do not vote in the
retention election.'12 While the 1996 average rolloff percentage in

8. See UNCERTAIN JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 98-99.
9. See MATHIAS, supra note 2, at 21.
10. See Pelander, supra note 5, at 686 (discussing Arizona's distribution to

all voters in brochure, public service announcements, and direct mailings).
11. See id. at 650-51.
12. See Larry Aspin, Trends in JudicialRetention Elections, 1964-1998, 83

JuDIcATuRE 79, 81 (1999).
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retention elections was relatively high at 29.5%, this figure represents an improvement over the period between 1976 and 1984 when
average rolloff was 36%. 13 Moreover, the average affirmative vote
in retention elections stood at 75.8% 4in 1998, rebounding from a
historic average low of 69.4% in 1990.1
The flip side of increasing voter participation in retention elections and confidence in judges standing for retention is an increasing
lack of voter differentiation among judges on the same ballot. Voters
can and do, albeit extremely rarely, single out individual judges for
defeat, but analysis of average affirmative votes for all judges on the
same ballot shows that "within a district the typical judge's affirmative vote differs very little from that of the other judges in the district."'15 Judicial performance evaluation programs, therefore, can be
premised at least in part on the need to provide voters with more specific information on each judge. This will allow them to make individualized decisions rather than voting all up or all down on multiple
retention candidates.
Official retention evaluation programs also seek to involve citizens more directly in the process of evaluating judges. Members of
the public are involved in the evaluation process as commission
members and as respondents to evaluation surveys. By actively
seeking citizen input, it is hoped that voters will see official evaluation information as reflecting their views, or their neighbors' views,
as well as attorneys' evaluations of judicial performance.
In addition to improving voter awareness and citizen involvement, official retention evaluation programs can be effective counters to biased or politically motivated judicial evaluations conducted
by interest groups seeking to rid the bench of judges they perceive to
be unfavorable to their issues. Among the most frequently cited instances of successful "Vote No" campaigns led by interest groups are
the defeats of Justice Penny White of the Tennessee Supreme Court
and Justice David Lanphier of the Nebraska Supreme Court, both in
1996.16 In both instances, interest groups launched well-funded,
13.
14.
15.
16.

Seeid. at 81.
See id. at 79-80.
Id. at 81.
See Traciel V. Reid, The Politicizationof Retention Elections: Lessons

from the Defeat ofJustices Lanphier and White, 83 JUDICATuRE 68, 68 (1999).
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last-minute campaigns that focused voters' attention on single decisions. Voters had no neutral performance evaluation to rely upon,
making Justices White and Lanphier all the more vulnerable to political attack. 17 Had official performance evaluations been conducted
in Tennessee and in Nebraska in 1996, Justices White and Lanphier
may still have lost their retention bids, but they would have at least
been able to point to the results of independent, nonpolitical evaluations. In addition, the existence of official performance evaluations
may reduce the necessity of fund-raising by judges who face organized opposition, especially in those states that disseminate evaluation
results widely.
As evaluation commissions are public and do not represent a
particular ideology or set of issues, they can help to focus voters' decision making on "the commonly held value of a competent independent judiciary, rather than on partisanship or ideology."'18 Informal (nonrandom) exit polls of retention election voters conducted by
the American Judicature Society in 1996 in four states with retention
evaluation programs found that official evaluation information has a
positive impact on the electorate in terms of increasing participation
in retention elections and influencing voting choices.'
More focused study of voter behavior is needed, however, to determine
whether voters give more credence to official retention evaluation information than to interest group evaluations.
Stated goals of evaluation commissions differ from state to state,
but Arizona's Rules of Procedure for Judicial Performance Review
give the most comprehensive statement of commission goals. The
commission is to
assist voters in evaluating the performance of judges and
justices standing for retention; facilitate self-improvement
17. See id. at 69.
18. Kevin M. Esterling, Judicial Accountability the Right Way: Official
Performance Evaluations Help the Electorate as well as the Bench, 82
JuDIcATuRE 206, 215 (1999).

19. See id. at 210 (voters in Anchorage, Phoenix, Denver, and Salt Lake
City, were asked if the official evaluation information influenced their voting
choices (percent agreeing or strongly agreeing ranged from 59.8% in Anchorage to 81.6% in Denver), and if they were more likely to vote in a judicial
election because of the official evaluation information (percent agreeing or
strongly agreeing ranged from 64.6% in Anchorage to 72.0% in Denver)).
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of all judges and justices subject to retention; promote appropriate judicial assignments; assist in identifying needed
judicial education programs; and otherwise generally promote the goals of judicial performance review, which are to
protect judicial independence while fostering public accountability of the judiciary.20
III. PROGRAM MODELS
The following overview of retention evaluation commissions'
structure and procedures draws heavily on the results of a 1996-1997
American Judicature Society study of programs in Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, and Utah.2 1 Additional information on newer retention
evaluation programs in New Mexico22 and Tennessee was collected
for the purpose of this briefing paper.
The six states currently using official retention evaluation programs share common goals, with some notable variations in procedure. Tables describing evaluation procedures and performance criteria are included below as an effective means of summarizing a vast
amount of commission-specific information.
Generally speaking, all commissions base their evaluations and
recommendations on both statistical and qualitative information from
23

a variety of sources. They conduct formal surveys of court users
and meet with judges to discuss evaluation results and selfimprovement goals. Several commissions also hold public hearings
or solicit public comment in writing.
Evaluation commissions generally send questionnaires only to

those attorneys who have appeared before the judge being evaluated,
in order to avoid evaluations that are based on second-hand informa-

tion or the overall reputation of the judge within the legal community. If questionnaires are sent to all attorneys in a particular

20. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17B (West 2000) (Supreme Court of Arizona,
Rules of Procedure for Judicial Performance Review: Implementation of Arizona Constitution Article 6(42) Proposition 109, Rule 1).
21. See KEViN M. EsTERLING & KATHLEEN M. SAMPSON, JUDICIAL
RETENTION EVALUATION PROGRAMS IN FOUR STATES: A REPORT WITH
(1998).
22. See New Mexico JudicialCommission, supra note 3.

RECOMMENDATIONS

23. For information on groups surveyed in each state, see infra Table 1.
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jurisdiction, as is the case in Alaska, respondents must indicate their
level of direct professional experience with the judge being evaluated.
TABLE 1: EVALUATION PROCEDURES2 4
Alaska

Arizona

Colorado

Groups
surveyed

Alaska Bar
members;
peace and
probation
officers;
court stafP,
jurors for last
2 years of
term

Attorneys,
litigants,
witnesses,
jurors,
other
judgesl
justices,
court
staff

Jurors, litigants, court
personnel,
probation officers, social
service and
law enforcement personnel, crime
victims, attorneys

Nonsurvey
sources of
information

Judge's selfevaluation;
legal, discipline, health
records; attomeys in 912 major
cases;judicial conduct
commission;
conflict of
interest fllings

Judge's
previous
selfevaluations and
professional
goals

Caseload
evaluation;
interview with
the judge

New
Mexicos
Appellate
level:
Attorneys,
fellow appellate
judges, trial
judges, law
clerks, staff
attorneys,
court personnel, law
professors
Judge's
selfevaluation;
interview
with the
judge

Tennessee
(Appellate)
Attomeys,
court personnel,
other oppellate
judges, trial
judges

Judges'
selfreporting
form;
caseloadf
work output data;
disclosure
of any disciplinary
actions of
Court of the
Judiciary

Utah
Attoreys,
jurors

Compliance
with caserunderadvisemant
standard;
completion
of 30 hours
continuing
education
pryear;
compliance
with Code
ofJudicial
I Conduct

24. Table 1 was adapted from Table I-3: Evaluation procedures from
ESTERLiNG & SAMPSON, supranote 21, at 27.

25. See New Mexico JudicialCommission, supra note 3. The New Mexico
Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission also evaluates trial court judges
seeking retention. Groups surveyed for trial court evaluations are: attorneys,
litigants, jurors, court personnel, adult and juvenile probation officers, social
service personnel, psychologists, bail bondsmen, court interpreters, citizen review volunteers, Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) volunteers, and
law enforcement officers. Additional nonsurvey sources of information for
trial court evaluations include caseload evaluations and court observations, if
warranted. See id.
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Tennessee
(Appellate)

Alaska

Arizona

Colorado

Public
input

Hearings,
newspaper
ads and
PSAs encourage
public cornment

Public
hearings;
requests
for public comment in
writing

Public hearings; public
comment in
writing

No

Public
hearings;
public
comment
solicited
through
Web page

No

Utah

Judge interview
mandatory?

Council
.may" interview; draft
results
shared with
judge prior
to final
evaluation
meeting

Factual
report
must be
sent to
judge;
judge
can
submit
written
response;
conference
team
inter-

Yes, after receiving analysis of survey
results

Yes, after
receiving
analysis of
survey resuits

Yes

Judge may
request
interview if
he or she
fails to
meet ccrtification
standards

views

Surveys of other court users, such as jurors, litigants, witnesses,
and court personnel, are generally distributed in court; respondents
are asked to mail their completed surveys to an independent data
center to ensure confidentiality throughout the evaluation process.
Commissions do not factor anonymous citizen comments in their
evaluation recommendations, but may provide such comments to
judges for their own use.
Retention evaluation commissions vary in their organizational
structure. Most commissions include lawyers, judges, and nonlawyer members, although Colorado's commissions have no judge

26. See New Mexico JudicialCommission, supra note 3. The New Mexico
Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission also evaluates trial court judges
seeking retention. Groups surveyed for trial court evaluations are: attorneys,
litigants, jurors, court personnel, adult and juvenile probation officers, social
service personnel, psychologists, bail bondsmen, court interpreters, citizen review volunteers, Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) volunteers, and
law enforcement officers. Additional nonsurvey sources of information for
trial court evaluations include caseload evaluations and court observations, if
warranted. See id.
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members. Commissions range in size from the seven members of
the Alaska Judicial Council-including three lawyers, three nonlawyers, and the chiefjustice 2 -- to the thirty-member Arizona Commission on Judicial Performance Review-including six lawyers, eighteen nonlawyers, and six judges.29 Because all Colorado judges stand
for retention, the state has one statewide commission for the appellate levels and twenty-two district commissions for trial judges up for
retention in each district. 30 All other states have a single retention
evaluation commission. In Alaska, Arizona, and Utah, lawyer members of commissions are selected by state bar boards of governors.
In Arizona, for example, the supreme court selects from a list submitted by the Arizona Bar Board of Governors. The lawyer and
nonlawyer members of each Colorado commission, however, are appointed by the chief justice, the governor, the Speaker of the House,
and the president of the Senate. Nonlawyer members of commissions are selected, with legislative confirmation, by the governor in
Alaska, by the supreme court in Arizona, and by a variety of elected
officeholders in New Mexico. Evaluation commissioners generally
have staggered terms, ranging from three to six years in length, and
must disqualify themselves
if a conflict of interest arises in evaluat31
ing a particular judge.
The stated criteria used by evaluation commissions also varies
from state to state. New Mexico's Statewide Judicial Performance
Evaluation Program, for example, bases evaluations on fairness,
knowledge and understanding of the law, ability to communicate,
preparation and attentiveness, and effectiveness in working with
court personnel.32 Naturally, questionnaires sent to attorneys include
27. See Recommendationsfor JudicialRetention: November 7, 2000 Election, available at http:l/vvw.cobar.org/judges/nov2000/ (last visited Mar. 6,
2001) [hereinafter Recommendations].
28. See Alaska JudicialCouncil: Membership, availableat http/wwwv.ajc.
state.ak.us/AJCMEM.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2001).
29. See Arizona Commission on Judicial Performance Review: Membership, at http://supreme.state.az.us/jpr/JPRPublicMBRLIST-O1.PDF (updated
Feb. 15, 2001).
30. See Recommendations, supranote 27.
31. Information on commission membership is adapted from Table 111-2:
Commission membership found in ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 21, at
24.
32. See New Mexico JudicialCommission, supra note 3.
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a greater number of questions relating to legal ability, whereas questionnaires sent to litigants, witnesses, or jurors focus more on issues
of integrity, judicial temperament, and administrative skills.
The Arizona Superior Court evaluation survey illustrates the different approaches used with different respondent groups. 33 Respondents are asked to rate superior court judges on the following criteria:
"unacceptable," "poor," "satisfactory," "very good," "superior," and
"can't rate. ' 34
Litigants, witnesses, jurors, and self-represented litigants rate
judges on the following criteria: integrity, communication skills, judicial temperament, and administrative performance. Integrity includes separate questions on equal treatment regardless of race, gender, economic status, and basic fairness and impartiality.
Communication skills evaluate the candidates on whether their oral
communications are clear and logical. Judicial temperament looks at
the candidates' understanding and compassion, dignity, courteousness, conduct promoting public confidence in the court, and ability.
Administrative performance includes punctuality in conducting proceedings, maintenance of control in courtroom, and work ethics. Jurors who served are asked the questions above, with additional questions under communication skills, i.e., whether the candidate
explained proceedings, reasons for delays, jurors' responsibilities,
and gave clear instructions. Additionally, participants are asked in
what capacity they were a party to the trial-plaintiff, witness, etc.as well as race or ethnicity and gender. Finally, space is provided for
narrative comments.35
Attorneys who have appeared before the judge rate on the following criteria: legal ability, integrity, communication skills, judicial temperament, administrative performance, and settlement activities. The legal ability category encompasses legal reasoning ability,
knowledge of substantive law, knowledge of rules of evidence,
knowledge of rules of procedure, knowledge of laws pertaining to
33. For further information on different approaches, see graphic on Arizona

superior court surveys adapted from ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 21, at
88; see also Pelander, supra note 5, at 673-74 (comparing the attorney survey
from that used by other respondents).
34. See Pelander, supra note 5, at 673-74.
35. See ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 21, at 88.
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sentencing, and ability to keep up to date. Integrity implies conduct
free from impropriety; separate questions on equal treatment regardless of race, gender, and economic status; avoiding prejudging outcomes of cases; and basic fairness and impartiality. Communication
skills include clear and logical oral communications or directions,
and clearly and logically written decisions. Judicial temperament includes understanding and compassion, dignity, courteousness, conduct promoting public confidence in the court, and ability. In addition to the basis for rating administrative performance given to
litigants, witnesses, jurors, and self-represented litigants, attorneys
are asked to rate this category based on the candidates' promptness
in making rulings and rendering decisions, and their efficient management of the calendar. The settlement activities category includes
appropriate actions in encouraging settlement negotiations, promotion of negotiation without coercion or threats, careful exploration of
the strengths and weaknesses of each party's case, mediation skills,
and credible settlement appraisals. Space is given for narrative
comments.36

Following the completion of the full evaluation process, commissions take a public vote to recommend or not recommend retention of each judge. Each state commission uses different language in
making recommendations, and some, such as Alaska, provide aggregate numerical ratings of judges' survey results.3 7 Arizona has developed a unique "conference team" structure that allows each
evaluated judge to discuss evaluation results, whether negative or
positive and before they are publicly released, with a three-member
team that includes one nonlawyer, one lawyer, and one judge or justice. In meetings with conference teams,
judges develop specific,
38
goals.
improvement
written performance
Finally, commissions face perhaps their most daunting taskwide dissemination of evaluation results and recommendations to the
voting public to ensure the usefulness of the evaluation process.
Commissions in Alaska, Colorado, and Utah are able to mail evaluation results directly to voters, generally as part of a larger voter

36. See id.; Pelander, supra note 5, at 673-74.
37. See Esterling, supra note 18, at 210-11.
38. Seeid. at212.
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information pamphlet mailed to all registered voters. Other states
rely on a host of methods for disseminating evaluation results, including: Web pages; voter pamphlets made available at polling
places, libraries, banks, shopping centers, courts, bar offices, etc.;
newspaper coverage; public service announcements on television and
39
radio; and meetings with community groups.
Regardless of the professionalism and thoroughness of the
evaluation process, all can go for naught if adequate funds are not
available for widespread dissemination of results. Prior to 1998, for
instance, results of the Colorado Judicial Performance Evaluation
Program were not included in the lieutenant governor's voter information guide that is mailed to all households. Despite the fact that
the Colorado commissions were able to disseminate approximately
600,000 copies of their own judicial retention voter guides in 1996,
widespread frustration with limited dissemination capabilities threatened the viability of the evaluation program. 40 Colorado's experience should serve as a cautionary tale to other states-sufficient
funds for dissemination of results must be a precondition for establishing a retention evaluation program.
IV. VIEWS OF EVALUATION PROGRAMS

Generally, judicial retention evaluation programs are given high
marks by judges, evaluation commissioners, and voters. Significant
concerns exist, however, over the accuracy and fairness of evaluation
programs and the impact of evaluations on judicial independence.
Table 2 highlights a sampling of judges' key concerns regarding
commission methods, accuracy, and fairness.

39. See id. at 209.
40. See ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supranote 21, at 30.
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TABLE 2: COMMISSION METHODS, ACCURACY, AND FAIRNESS

Statement _)*
I have an adequate opportunity to
respond to commission results be-

Percent a

in or stro Ply agming

Alaska

Arizona

Colorado

(N)

.NL(N)

42.9
(7)

60.0
(35)

61.0

34.4

53.4

(59)

(32)

(133)

(__

( )

Utah

AlIjudges

9)

(32)

(133)

Judges have access to a fair appeals
process if they disagree with the

20.0
(5)

51.6
(31)

30.2
(53)

30.8
(26)

35.7
(115)

commission's report.

(5)

(31)

(5)_26_(15

evaluation commission to collect

66.7

66.7

60.7

57.6

62.0

information about my performance

(9)

(39)

(61)

(33)

(142)

22.2

33.3

14.5
(62)

50.0
(32)

28.2
(142)

fore they are made public.

)

(3)

The overall process used by the

is fair.

The evaluation process undermines

my independence as a judge.
(9)
(39)
* (N) denotes the number of people responding to the query.

The 50% of Utah judges surveyed who felt that the evaluation
process undermines judicial independence were primarily concerned
with the fact that, in 1996, the Utah Judicial Council surveyed only
attorneys. 42 The addition of a juror survey in Utah in 1997 might
improve Utah judges' view of the process. But one cannot ignore the
fact that 28.2% of all judges surveyed in 1996 believed that the process undermines judicial independence, even when multiple court user
groups are surveyed. Special attention should also be paid to judges'
concerns regarding evaluation methods and demands for a process to
appeal evaluation results. The problem of accuracy of results is most
magnified in rural areas, where only a handful of attorneys or law enforcement officers may return surveys. Clearly, the potential for
misleading evaluation results is high when an insufficient number of
surveys are returned or when one segment of the attorney population
is overrepresented. Judges also must feel that they have adequate
opportunities to address questionable or negative evaluation results.
Retention evaluation commissioners have also expressed concerns about outside political pressures on the evaluation process. If a
commission has inadequate staff and funding, or finds itself
41. See ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 21, at 30; interview with
Kathleen M. Sampson, director of the Hunter Center for Judicial Selection and
Seth Andersen, program manager, and director of the Colorado Judicial Performance Evaluation Program in Denver, Colorado.
42. See ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 21, at 30.
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defending the evaluation program from hostile legislation, its independence and credibility can be threatened. Inadequate funding
compromises the most crucial element of an evaluation
program43
methodologically sound and fair survey administration.
V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on its intensive study of retention evaluation programs in
four states, the American Judicature Society has offered the following recommendations for ensuring the validity of evaluation programs:
1. Establish clear rules and procedures for the performance
evaluation process.
2. Provide adequate funding.
3. Develop clear, measurable performance standards.
4. When there is a sufficiently large pool of respondents, adopt
standard random sampling and appropriate follow-up procedures when surveying court user groups.
5. Ensure confidentiality in surveys and in commission deliberations to promote candid responses by surveyed individuals and frank discussion among commissioners.
6. Establish strong self-improvement components of the performance evaluation process.
7. Mandate a procedure for judges to receive and respond to
evaluation results before they are made public.
8. Establish an effective mechanism for disseminating evaluation reports to the public.
9. Establish a mechanism to incorporate evaluation results in
designing judicial education programs.
10. Establish linkages with print media.
11. Leave the process open to amendment.
12. Establish training programs for all evaluation commissioners.
44
13. Involve the public in and educate them about the process.

43. See id. at215.
44. See ESTERLING & SAMPSON, supra note 21, at 117-21 (full text of recommendations).
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Judicial retention evaluation programs that are designed and
conducted carefully can accrue many benefits to the judiciary and the
public. The anonymity of evaluation survey responses provides
more honest commentary and constructive criticism of job performance than judges normally receive. Voters in retention elections
benefit from an objective source of evaluative information. Finally,
the shared desire for some measure of judicial accountability to the
public expressed through the institution of retention elections is
given better definition through a process of evaluation that is based
on a well-defined set of nonpolitical performance criteria.
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